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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
GLEN W. MECHAM 
Respondent, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
11527 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the District 
Court of Utah County be affirmed. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a court finding of guilty to the 
crime of indecent assault. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial without jury, the lower court judge found 
defendant-appellant guilty and he was sentenced to an indeterm-
inate term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, 
as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On or about August 2, 1968, Lou Ann Cordner, the com-
plaining witness in this case, was retrieving her brother's bicycle 
from the area around defendant-appellant home. He approached 
her and asked her how old she was, what grade she was in and 
commented that she was just the right age (T.7). Defendant 
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said that he liked Lou Ann and asked her to be his girl, kissed 
her on her hands and felt her breasts ( T .7) . Lou Ann testified 
that the defendant-appellant felt her breasts and her private 
area and rubbed her on her body. He also asked her to get into 
m old car which was situated behind his house so that "he could 
suck my breasts." Lou Ann told him that she had to go home, 
at which time defendant asked her if he could feel her one more 
time and she told him no (T.8). According to Lou Ann, he 
also placed his hand underneath her panties. Lou Ann returned 
home and related the experience to her mother who went next 
door to talk to Mrs. Thomas, the Relief Society president, and 
Mrs. Thomas advised her to call the police (T. l 0). 
Lou Ann's mother, Mrs. Shirley Cordner, testified that 
when Lou Ann returned home she burst into tears, was unable 
to talk to her, and finally after playing twenty questions with 
her daughter, Mrs. Cordner was able to get from Lou Ann 
simply the words "Mr. Mecham." The incident in question was 
detailed to Lou Ann's mother in bits and pieces after that 
(T.17). 
The story related by Lou Ann Cordner on the witness 
stand was mbstant~ally the same as that which she told her 
mother immediately after the incident. Mrs. Cordner also test-
ified as to the red m:trks on the chest area of Lou Ann (T.19). 
Lou Ann reported to her mother that these marks were a re-
sult of the rubbing of the defendant's hands in that area. 
Mrs. Margene Tadd, Orem City Secretary, testified that 
on the afternoon in question at about 4:00 p.m. she had oc-
casion to examine the complainant, Lou Ann Cordner, and 
found a raw spot around her breast area about two inches in 
diameter (T.2 5). 
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After Mrs. Tadd's testimony, the State rested its case and 
a motion to dismiss the complaint on grounds of failure to 
establish a prima facie case was denied by the State (T.27). 
Defendant-appellant, Mr. Mecham, took the stand and 
denied commission of the offense claiming that he had never 
seen Lou Ann on the day of the assault (T.3 0). Defendant 
claimed in his testimony to have never been out of the pres-
ence of some person during the day, not even to go to the bath-
room (T.31). However, in later testimony, a neighbor boy, 
Mark Sydall, who spent most of the day with Mr. Mecham, 
testified that Mr. Mecham did go to the bathroom during the 
day (T.50). 
After a complaint was sworn out charging the defendant 
with the crime of indecent assault, Richard 0. Chatterton, 
police officer for Orem City, was given the job of serving a 
felony warrant on the defendant with a Detective Ward (T.70). 
In his testimony to the court, Mr. Chatterton indicated that 
he was detailed to watch the rear door of the house when they 
went to serve the felony warrant on Mr. Mecham. Officer 
Chatterton testified that he saw a person coming out of the 
bedroom window. He told him to hold it right there and the 
person fell to the ground (T.71). Oficer Chatterton told the 
person to stand up and to put his hands against the side of the 
house. He searched the man and found no weapon, handcuffed 
him and put him under arrest (T.72). Officer Chatterton 
identified th~ defendant as the person he arrested attempting to 
escape from the home at the same time Officer Ward was at-
tempting to serve the felony warrant (T.72). 
After closing statements by the State and the defense, the 
Court entered a. finding of guilty of the charge of indecent 
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assault (T.78). The words of the Court arc important for 
basis of considering defendant's appeal: 
"I thing the little girl was telling the truth. The 
event may not have occurred on the 2nd day of Aug-
ust, but on some date very close to that time. 
It seems to me that it couldn't very well have 
been a fabrication of what she said. 
I don't need to find that the witness other 
than the defendant falsified. They may have done but 
it may have been just a mistake. It may have been a 
different day that this occurred. I don't know. 
The court finds the defendant guilty as charged." 
(T.78). 
The judgment of commitment was entered on the 27th 
day of December, 1968, by Judge Maurice Harding. The de-
fendant reuested probation, which was refused. The defendant 
was remanded to the custody of the Utah County Sheriff to 
be delivered to the Warden of the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term or not more than five years. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO "PRESUMPTION ~'REASONABLE 
DOUBT" IN CRIMIN AL CASES, AND THE FINDING OF 
GUILTY BY THE LOWER COURT WAS AMPLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT CON-
TRARY TO THE LAW. 
The first point raised by appellant is in regards to the fol-
lowing language of the judge in finding appellant guilty of "in-
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decent assault." (Utah Code Annotated 1953, ~ 76-7-9.) 
"I think the little girl was telling the truth. The 
event may not hai1e occurred on the 2nd day of 
August, but on some date very close to that time. 
"It seems to me that it couldn't very well have 
been a fabrication of what she said. 
"I don't need to find that the witnesses, other 
than the defendant, falsified. They may have done. 
But it may have befn a different day that this oc-
curred. I don't know. 
"The Court finds the defendant guilty as 
charged." 
Tr., at 78. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Appellant contends that since the information returned 
charged him with an offense committed "on the 2nd day of 
August, 1968," (R.11), the comments of the judge that the 
offense might have occurred on "some date close to that time" 
(Tr. 78) show the failure of the evidence to conform to the 
time alleged in the information, and that therefore a convic-
tion was not warranted. 
Utah Code Annotated 77-21-12 is relevant on this point: 
" ( 1) An information or indictment need con-
tain no allegation of the time of the offense unless 
such allegation is necessary to charge the offense un-
der Section 77-21-8. 
" ( 2) The allegation in an information or indict-
ment that the defendant committed the offense 
shall in all cases be considered an allegation that the 
offense was committed after it became an offense and 
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before the filing of the information or indictment, 
and within the period of limitations prescribed by law 
for the prosecution of the offense." 
Appellant wa5 charged with the offense of indecent as-
sault (76-7-9) which docs not require a specific allegation of 
time to charge the offense under 77-21-8. The statute on 
"Time," supra, reflects the common law of the State of Utah 
on the immateriality of time in charging a crime. State v. 
Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 146 P. 306 (1915). 
In State v. Cox, 106 Utah 253, 147 P.2d 858 (1944), 
this Court held that time allegations were not necessary to 
charge the crime of murder, and said: 
'"We have repeatedly held that the allegation 
of time is immaterial, that regardless of the time al-
leged, except where made certain by a bill of partic-
ulars, the State may prove the offense at any time 
within the statutory period of limitations." 
Id., at 256. (It should be noted here that no bill of particulars 
was filed in the instant case, so therefore the allegation of 
time was immaterial.) 
Where a defendant was convicted of carnal knowledge, 
this court held time to be immaterial, so long as a specific 
place was alleged and proven, in State v. Distefano, 70 Utah 
586, 262 P. 113 (1927). In that case, testimony was received 
of several acts of intercourse, but the one proven was a single 
act in a single locale, and the conviction was affirmed. The 
Court said: 
"It is therefore well established in this jurisdic-
tion that where time is not of the essence of the crime 
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the exact time is immaterial, and if the evidence other-
wise supports the charge relied upon by the prosecu-
tion, a conviction may not he set aside because the 
crime was committed after the date charged in the in-
formation or indictment, so long as it was committed 
prior to the beginning of the prosecution." 
Id., at 595. See also: State v. Gates, 118 Utah 117, 220 P.2d 
115 (1950). 
In the Distefano case, this Court also said that usual~y 
any day within the statute of limitations can be proven, re: 
gardless of what is alleged. 70 Utah, at 593. 
Clearly, on the basis of both Utah case law and the applica-
ble statute (Utah Code Annotated, 77 -21-12) no error is 
present in the findings of the trial court that the offense alleged 
to have been committed on August 2nd, 1968, might have 
been committed on another day. 
In his statement of points, appellant raises as Point IV 
issues substantially covered by Point I, except the last line, 
which alleges a defense alibi. However, appellant has not argued 
the matter in the body of his brief, and presumably does not 
now wish to raise that issue. Under Utah law, time does be-
come material if the defense of alibi is raised. State 11. Cooper, 
114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 (1949). But defendant did not 
raise the issue at trial, and by not arguing "alibi" in his brief 
must be deemed to have waived it on appeal. 
Although this Court has not, to respondent's knowledge, 
passed on the issue of waiver of defenses, the rulings of our 
sister states clearly hold matters not argued in brief are deemed 
waived on appeal. Sec: State t'. Brown, (Washington), 447 
P.2d 82 (1968). 
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In Pea/de l'. Goodall, 231 P.2d 119 (1951) the Fourth 
District Court of Appeals in California held that the duty of 
an appellant to cite authorities and argue points raised in his 
brief was affirmativ~ md could not be shifted to the respondent 
or the court. Id., at 123. 
Appellant further contends that the complaining wit-
ness, Lou Ann Cordner, told a "direct lie" and that the law 
would not support the finding of guilty. 
It is a principle so well established as to need no citation 
to authorities that the credibility of a witness is for the court 
to decide, rnd that only a clear abuse of discretion will be 
disturbed on appeal. 
A proper foundatio!l was laid by the prosecuting attorney 
for the use of Lou Ann's testimony Tr. 5, 6). Statutory law 
has uased the former restrictions on children serving as wit-
nesses: Utah Code Annotated 78-24-1,2. 
Under Section 1, all persons, without exception, may be 
witnesses, who have organs of sense, can perceive, and make 
known their perceptions to others. 
Under Section 2, children under ten years of age "who 
3ppear incJp:1ble of receiving just impressions of the facts re-
specting which they Jre exJmined, or of relating them truly," 
Jre not permittP.d to be witnesses. 
Lou Ann was at time of trial eleven years old (Tr. 4) and 
hence was competent under Utah law to testify even without 
the foundation laid by the prosecutor. 
It may be noted that Ut:ih Code Annotated 77-44-1 pro-
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vides the competency of witnesses m criminal actions 1s to 
be determined by the civil rules. (The exceptions to this rule 
provided for in the criminal code are not applicable in instant 
cise.) 
If the trial judge chose to accept the testimony of the 
complaining witness. and from his preferred position of obser-
vation rejected the disclaimers of defendant, this Court should 
not disturb the findings of the lower court. Most often, in 
these type of offenses--committed in stealth and secrecy-
the testimony of the ynuth is the only one available, and the 
trial court, or jury, must determine credibility from its pre-
ferred position of observation of the witnesses. State v. Smith, 
16 Utah 2d 374, 376, 401 P.2d 445 (1965). 
Finally, appellant argues that all doubt be resolved in his 
favor due to the presumption of innocence. Of course, his be-
lief that there was doubt as to hsi guilt was evidently not 
shared by the Court: "I think the little girl was telling the 
truth." (Tr. 78). 
Appellant cites several state court cases in support of 
this contention that all doubt as to guilt must be resolved in 
his favor. Respondent will stipulate that the holdings of these 
cases are as appellant contends, except as to the case of Peo-
ple v. Lowe, 209 California 199, 286 P. 697 (1930), cited at 
p. 14, appellant's brief. The quotation there reproduced was 
not found in the reports of that case. 
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's doubt 
was not shared by the Court, and that resolving of any doubt 
of guilt in favor of an accused occurs not if the doubt is in 
the mind of the :iccused, but if doubt exists in the mind of 
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judge or jury. On the basis of the record, and given the lower 
court's statement that he accepted Lou Ann's testimony and 
not defend.mt-appellants (Tr. 78), there was not doubt to be 
resolved in favor of appellant's innocence. 
POINT II 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF A PUB-
LIC TRIAL MAY BE \V AIVED BY A DEFENDANT OR 
HIS COUNSEL, AS OCCURRED IN INST ANT CASE. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
contains a guarantee of a public trial that is applicable to the 
States through the due process clause of the f'ourteenth Amend-
ment. 
Utah's Constitution contains a similar guarantee in Article 
I, Section 12, which details the rights of accused persons. The 
right to a public trial has also been codified: Utah Code An-
notated, 77-1-8(6). 
Appellant contends he was denied his right to a public 
trial when, on motion of the State, the courtroom was cleared 
of all except the dcfendan t and court personnel. (Tr. 3, 4) . 
Although appellant cites no cases in support of this al-
leged error, the law of Utah clearly entitles an accused to a 
public trial. State v. Jordan, 57 Utah 612, 196 P. 565 (1921). 
The power to exclude certain witnesses under the statute is 
applicable tc criminal procedure. Id. 
However, a defendant clearly may waive this right, either 
personally or through counsel. State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 
62 P.2d 1110 (1936) where this Court said: 
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"The record docs not show a verbal concurrence 
by either the defendant or his counsel to the stip-
ulation (to clear the courtroom) announced by the 
district attorney, but it does show that they were 
present in court and acquiesced silently in the stipula-
tion stated." 
Id., at 491-492. 
Turning to the transcript of appellant's trial, we find a 
similar acquiescense by silence of both appellant and his coun-
sel (Tr. 3, 4). 
Particularly, Mr. Ivins, the district attorney, asked for 
exclusion of spectators, including witnesses, then said: "Maybe 
Mr. Taylor (appellant's counsel) would join with me in con-
senting that this be done?" Appellant, and his counsel, failed 
to respond, indicating acquiescense. Later, Mr. Taylor said, 
"You want to exclude all witnesses, until they testify, is that 
what you want?" But neither he, nor appellant objected to the 
exclusion order of this Court. 
Under the rnle of State v. Smith, supra, appellant clearly 
waived his right to a public trial on the basis of the record, 
which show;; both he and his counsel were present at the time 
the State requested exclusion and failed to object to the Court's 
order (Tr. 3, 4). 
Every case which respondent has found which reversed 
a conviction for failure to grant a public trial involved a case 
of defense vbjections made to a court's exclusion orders. State 
v. Meyers, 14 Utah 2d 417, 38 5 P.2d 609 ( 1963); State v. 
Jordan, supra; State v. Be.ck.stead, 96 Utah 528, 88 P.2d 461 
(1939). 
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Since defendant-appellant, or his counsel, failed to object 
to the exclusion order, he therefore waived his right to a jury 
trial. Appellant is bound by the actions of his counsel. Sn:: 
State v. Farnsworth, 13 Utah 2d 103, 368 P.2d 914 ( 1962), 
where this Court sa!d: 
"The record indicates no action or inaction by 
the trial attorney which could not rationally find ex-
planation in a legitimate exercise of strategy-partic-
ularly when the case was tried before a judge with-
out a jury." 
Id., at 104. 
Although the traditional rationale of exclusion is to protect 
youthful witnesses when they must recite intimate personal 
details, respondent submits that the action of appellant's coun-
sel in acquiescing to the State's request for exclusion may find 
"explanation in a legitimate exercise of strategy." This was a 
case of indecent <issualt. Appellant's counsel may have felt 
public sentiment might be running against his client, and that 
his client's interests might best be protected by the exclusion 
order. 
Appellant expresses the belief that had the public been 
present, to see and hear what went on behind closed doors, 
there would not have been a finding of guilty. 
The answer is that the public can at least "hear," by read-
ing the public record, what went on. Appellant's fears might 
have been well-founded in the days of the Inquisition, stocks, 
and the rack, but respondent contends our present judicial 
system has gone to great lengths to protect the accused in crim-
inal cases, witness this appeal. Defense counsel was present to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 3 
assure appellant would not be subjected to any inquisitorial 
procedures so common in the Dark Ages. 
One further point. As noted earlier, most cases in the area 
of the right to a public trial involve denial of defendant's 
motion for :>. public trial, or defendant's objection to a trial 
court's exclusion order. Herein, appellant was not denied a 
public trial because he never demanded one, nor did he ob-
ject to the exclusion of the court. It might therefore be 
said that no denial of a public trial actually took place. 
POINT III 
THAT THE COURT BELIEVED THE COMPLAINNG 
WTNESS, AND NOT DEFENDANT'S "UNIMPEACHABLE 
WITNESSES," IS NO GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL. 
Appellant alleges it was an abuse of trial court's discretion 
to "ignore the undisputed testimony of five ( 5) mature adults, 
un-impeachable (sic) alibi witnesses," and to base its finding 
on the testimony of an eleven year old complaining witnsess, 
where "such testimony is contrary to scientific evidence ac-
cepted by t~·ial court." 
Respondent has searched the record in vain for any "con-
trary scientific evidence" that might run counter to Lou Ann 
Cordner's testimony. Appellant did inject into his statement 
of facts many matters not of record, but none of these could 
even be termed "scientific evidence" contrary to Lou Ann's 
testimony. (St'e: for instance, the measurement of appellant's 
back fence, stated as 3 Yi feet high at page 6 of appellant's 
brief, which fact was not proved at trial.) 
Earlier, respondent cited the case of State v. Smith, supra 
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at 4, to answer appellant's objections to being convicted on 
the basis of a youth'~ testimony. In that case, a six year old's 
testimony was found competent to convict the accused of in-
decent assault under the same statute as the instant case. Utah 
Code Annotated 76-7-9. 
This Court said that the mam requirement for witnesses 
under ten years of age as to competency was that they have 
sufficient intelligence and maturity to understand questions 
put to them, knowledge of the subject and facts involved, abil-
ity to remember and a sense of moral duty to tell the truth. 
16 Ut~h 2d, at 377. The ruling of a trial court on competency 
will not be disturbed on appeal in absence of a clear showing 
of abuse. Id. 
The following language in the Smith decision is especially 
relevant to appellant's contentions: 
" [I] t must be borne in mind that when such an 
offense is committed, it is done with the greatest pos-
sible stealth and secrecy, so that most often the testi-
mony of the victim, coupled with the type of corrob-
oration we have here, is the only evidence available 
upon which to determine guilt or innocense." 
Id., at 376. 
Respondent also draws the attention of this Court to the 
Utah statutes on witnesses, cited Supra at 4, and the fact that 
Lou Ann W<lS presumed competent by law to testify, even if 
the district attorney had not, as he did, laid the usual founda-
tion for child witnesses. 
See alsos State 1·. Dixon, 114 Utah 301, 199 P.2d 775 
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( 1948): six year old boy competent to testify in "infamous 
crime against nature" case; State t'. Williams, 111 Utah 379, 
180 P.2d 5il (1947): 13 year old case; with mental age of 
8-10 years, competent witness in rape case; State v. Sanchez, 
11 Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d 174 (1961): statutory rape case, 
ten year old prosecutrix competent witness. 
The transcript does not bear out appellant's contention 
that the trial court ignored or disbelieved the five defense wit-
nesses: 
"THE COURT: I thing the little girl was telling the 
truth .... 
I don't need to find that the witnesses, other than the 
defendant, falsified." 
(Tr.78). Clearly, the Court restricted its findings to (I) that 
the ~lleged assault occurred as Lou Ann Cordner claimed, ( 2 ) 
that defendant lied in denying the commission of the offense, 
and hence ( 3) appellant was guilty of indecent assault. 
Since the trial court was in a position to observe the de-
meanor of the witnesses, his findings should not be disturbed 
on appeal in absence of a showing of clear abuse of discretion. 
As further error under Point II, appellant contends his 
counsel should have called a witness, a Miss Janice Church, now 
his daughter-in-law, Mrs. Richard V. Mecham. Appellant con-
tends that she would have testified as to the period when the 
alleged assault occurred, as she was in the company of his son 
Richard Vincent Mecham, at the time. 
Respondent submits the defendant counsel's choice of 
witnesses to call is not a proper matter for appeal. This is a 
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matter of strategy, and as noted in State v. Farnsworth, supra at 
7, there is nothing in defense counsel's decision to exclude a 
witness "which could not rationally find explanation in a legit-
iniate exercise of strategy." 13 Utah 2d, at 104. Since the record 
fails to show incompetency of appellant's counsel, appellant 
cannot complain. State v. Abbott, 21 Utah 2d 307, 445 P.2d 
142 (1968). 
Since the evcluded witness was at all times relevant to the 
case in the company of appellant's son, Richard, who did test-
ify extensively (Tc. SI-60) counsel might have concluded her 
testimony was not needed. Richard Mecham was subjected to 
stringent cross-examination by the district attorney, and coun-
sel may have wished to avoid granting the State a similar oppor-
tunity with Richard's wife. There is no evidence available as to 
Mrs. Richard Mecham's availability or willingness to testify, 
both of which may have been factors in defense counsel's de-
cision not to utilize her as a witness. 
Appellant cites in support of raising new matter on appeal-
presumably by the potential testimony of Mrs. Richard V. 
Mecham - the case of Brooks v. State, 209 Mississippi 1 SO 
( 19 5 0), and characterizes it as a United States Supreme Court 
case. Appellant'5 brid at 17. 
First of all, the case cited is a Mississippi Supreme Court 
case, reported in 209 Mississippi 150 and 46 So.2d 94. As such, 
it details the Mississippi rule on raising new matter on appeal. 
The Utah rule i~ clearly contra: State 11. Starlight Club, 
17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 ( 1965), where this Court held 
it was not constrained to canvass a matter raised for the first 
time on appeal, and that it would not reverse a conviction on 
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matters dehors the record. Id, at 176. 
Secondly, in the Brooks case, the Court was concerned with 
constitutional due process process rights, whereas herein appel-
lant's concern is for the trial strategy adopted by his counsel, 
which respondent has shown to be binding on appellant in this 
instance. 
Appellant's Point III is clearly no grounds for reversal of 
his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully directs this Court's attention to 
the last two lines of page 1 5 of appellant's brief wherein he 
admits that he is "grabbing straws" and trying to save himself. 
Respondent stipulates that such seems to he the case. In fact, 
respondent submits such is the case inasmuch as appellant's 
brief has not advanced any legitimate legal reason or justifica-
tion for revc!"sing his conviction of indecent assault. 
Respondent respectfully submits that this Court should 
affirm the conviction of appellant based on the findings of the 
Honorable Judge who presided in the trial court below. Appel-
lant's right to a jury trial was effectively waived by himself 
and his counsel at trial and the fact that the Court chose to 
believe the complaining witness and not the defendant nor his 
"unimpeachable witnesses" is no grounds for reversal. The con-
viction below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
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